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Slow to Anger and Fast to Forgive: 
Cooperation in an Uncertain World 
 
Drew Fudenberg, David G. Rand, and Anna Dreber* 
 
 
Abstract:  We  study  the  experimental  play  of  the  repeated  prisoner’s  dilemma  when 
intended  actions  are  implemented  with  noise.  In  treatments  where  cooperation  is  an 
equilibrium, subjects cooperate substantially more than in treatments without cooperative 
equilibria.  In  all  settings  there  was  considerable  strategic  diversity,  indicating  that 
subjects had not fully learned the distribution of play. Furthermore, cooperative strategies 
yielded higher payoffs than uncooperative strategies in the treatments with cooperative 
equilibria. In these treatments successful strategies were “lenient” in not retaliating for 
the first defection, and many were “forgiving” in trying to return to cooperation after 
inflicting a punishment.  
 
Repeated games with observed actions have a great many equilibrium outcomes 
when players are patient, as shown by various folk theorems.
1 These theorems show that 
cooperative  play  is  possible  when  players  are  concerned  about  future  rewards  and 
punishments, but since repeated play of a static equilibrium is always an equilibrium of 
the repeated game, the folk theorems do no predict that cooperation will in fact occur. 
Intuition and evidence (e.g. Robert Axelrod 1984; Pedro Dal Bó 2005; Anna Dreber et al 
2008; Dal Bó and Guillaume Frechette 2009; John Duffy and Jack Ochs 2009) suggest 
that in repeated games with observed actions players do indeed tend to cooperate when 
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there is a cooperative equilibrium, at least if the gains to cooperation are sufficiently 
large.
2  
Outside of the laboratory, actions are often observed with noise: someone who 
claims they worked hard, or that they were too busy or sick to help, may or may not be 
telling the truth, and an awkward or inconvenient action may have been well-intentioned; 
similarly, a self-interested action may wind up accidentally benefiting another. In this 
setting too, there can be equilibria in which players do better than in the one-shot play of 
the game, as seen for example in the trigger-strategy equilibria constructed by Edward J. 
Green and Robert H. Porter (1984), and indeed a version of the folk theorem applies to 
repeated  games  with  imperfect  public  monitoring  provided,  as  shown  by  Fudenberg, 
David K. Levine and Maskin (1994).
3 Moreover, while there are evolutionary arguments 
for  cooperation  in  repeated  games  with  perfectly  observed  actions,  the  evolutionary 
arguments for cooperative equilibria are even stronger with imperfect observations, as the 
possibility  that  punishment  may  be  triggered  by  “mistake”  decreases  the  viability  of 
unrelenting  or  grim  strategies  that  respond  to  a  single  bad  observation  by  never 
cooperating again.
4 
This paper studies experimental play of the repeated prisoner’s dilemma when 
intended actions are implemented with noise. Our main goals are to understand whether 
and when subjects play cooperatively, and also to get a sense of the sorts of strategies that 
they use. We present evidence from four different payoff specifications for a repeated 
prisoner’s  dilemma,  with  stage  game  actions  “Cooperate”  (“C”)  and  “Defect”  (“D”) 
(neutral language was used in the experiment itself); the difference in specifications was 
                                                 
2 Dal Bó (2005) and Dal Bó and Frechette (2011) find that there need not be cooperation when the gain 
from cooperation is small. Earlier papers had found less cooperative play than these studies, but as Dal Bó 
(2005)  discusses  these  papers  had  various  methodological  flaws,  such  as  subjects  playing  vs.  an 
experimenter instead of each other, or extremely low payments.  
3  Public  monitoring means that  all  players  observe  a  public  signal  whose  distribution  depends  on  the 
actions played, as in the work of Dilip Abreu, David Pearce and Ennio Stachetti (1990). The noisy games 
we study have public monitoring, and satisfy the “identifiability” conditions that are needed for the folk 
theorem.  
4 Axelrod and William D. Hamilton (1981) applied the ESS solution concept to a small subset of the 
repeated game strategies. Fudenberg and Maskin (1990, 1994) and Ken Binmore and Larry Samuelson 
(1992) and show that ESS predicts cooperation in the prisoner's dilemma with noisy observations even 
when all finite-complexity strategies are allowed. Robert Boyd (1989) notes that noise permits cooperative 
strategies to be evolutionarily stable, but in his framework non-cooperative strategies are stable as well. A 
parallel literature considers explicit evolutionary dynamics on a restricted strategy  space; this includes 
Marcus W. Feldman and Ewart A.C. Thomas (1987), Martin A. Nowak and Karl Sigmund (1990), and 
Nowak et al. (2004) for the case of observed actions, and Nowak and Sigmund (1993) and Lorens A. 
Imhof, Fudenberg and Nowak (2007) for repeated games with noise. 3 
 
the benefit that playing “C” gives to the other player. We consider these four payoff 
specifications with a continuation probability of 7/8 and an error rate of 1/8. As controls 
we also consider error rates of 1/16 and 0 (no exogenously imposed error at all) under the 
“most cooperative” payoff specification, i.e. that with highest benefit to cost ratio. We 
find that there is much more cooperation in specifications where there is a “cooperative 
equilibrium” (an equilibrium in which players initially cooperate, and continue to do so at 
least until a  D is observed): players cooperate 49-61% of the time in treatments with 
cooperative  equilibria,  compared  to  32%  in  the  specification  without  cooperative 
equilibria. In these specifications, we also find that cooperative strategies yielded higher 
payoffs  than  uncooperative  ones.  Conversely,  in  the  one  treatment  where  “Always 
Defect” is the only equilibrium, this strategy was the most prevalent and had the highest 
payoff.  
As compared to experiments on the prisoner’s dilemma without noise, which we 
review  in  Section  II,  subjects  were  markedly  more  lenient  (slower  to  resort  to 
punishment). For example, in the payoff treatments that support cooperation, we find that 
subjects played C in 63-77% of the rounds immediately following their partner’s first 
defection,  compared  to  only  13-42%  in  the  cooperative  treatments  of  Dal  Bó  and 
Frechette (2011), Dreber et al. (2008) and our no-error control, which are the no-error 
games we will be using for comparison throughout.
5 Subjects also showed a considerable 
level  of  forgiveness  (willingness  to  give  cooperation  a  second  chance):  in  the  noisy 
specifications with cooperative equilibria, our subjects returned to playing C in 18-33% 
of rounds immediately following the breakdown of cooperation, as compared to 6-28% in 
the  games  without  error.
6  Consistent  with  these  findings,  subjects  are  more  likely  to 
condition on play more than one round ago in the noisy treatments than in the no-error 
games; 65% use strategies with longer memories in presence of error, compared to 28% 
in the games without error.  
                                                 
5 These statistics describe cooperation after one’s partner defects  for the first time, rather than overall 
cooperation. We find similar levels of overall cooperation without noise (78%) and with low noise of 1/16 
(82%), but substantially less overall cooperation with high noise 1/18 (59%). 
6 This describes histories in which (i) at least one subject chose C in the first round, (ii) in at least one 
previous round, the initially cooperative subject chose C while the other subject chose D and (iii) in the 
immediately previous round the formerly cooperative subject played D. 4 
 
In  addition  to  such  descriptive  statistics,  we  more  explicitly  explore  which 
strategies  our  subjects  used,  using  the  techniques  of  Dal  Bó  and  Frechette  (2011).
7 
Relatively few subjects used the strategy “Tit-for-Tat” (TFT) which was prevalent in the 
Dal Bó and Frechette (2011) experiment, or the strategy “Perfect Tit-for-Tat” (PTFT, also 
called  “Win-Stay,  Lose-Shift”)  which  is  favored  by  evolutionary  game  theory  in 
treatments where it is an equilibrium if players are restricted to strategies that depend 
only  on  the  previous  round’s  outcome,  as  is  commonly  assumed  in  that  literature.
8 
Instead, the most prevalent cooperative strategies were “Tit-for-2-Tats” (TF2T, punish 
once  after  two  defections),  “2-Tits-for-2-Tats”  (2TF2T,  punish  two  times  after  two 
defections),  both  of  which  are  forgiving,  and  modified,  lenient  versions  of  the  Grim 
strategy, which wait for two or three defections before abandoning cooperation. These 
results, and other descriptive measures of subjects’ play, show that subjects can and do 
use strategies that look back more than one round, at least in games with noise.  
We find considerable strategic diversity in all settings: No strategy has probability 
of  greater  than  30%  in  any  treatment,  and  typically  three  or  four  strategies  seem 
prevalent. Moreover,  in  every treatment a substantial  number of players seem to use 
ALLD (“Always Defect”). That strategy does quite poorly in treatments where most of 
the  subjects  are  playing  strategies  that  are  conditionally  cooperative,  but  it  is  a  best 
response  to  the  belief  that  most  other  subjects  play  ALLD.  Similarly,  a  substantial 
fraction of agents cooperate in the treatment where ALLD earns the highest payoff. We 
take this as evidence that learning was incomplete, and that it is difficult to learn the 
optimal response to the prevailing distribution of play.
9 
An alternative explanation for the diversity of play is that it reflects a distribution 
of  social  preferences,  with  some  subjects  preferring  to  cooperate  even  if  it  does  not 
maximize their own payoffs, and others playing to maximize the difference between their 
                                                 
7 In section III we summarize the findings of Claus Wedekind and Manfred Milinski (1996) and Masaki 
Aoyagi and Frechette (2009), who also analyzed the strategies used in a repeated prisoner’s dilemma, and 
of Jim Engle-Warnick and Robert L. Slonim (2006), who examined the strategies used in a trust game. 
With the exception of Aoyagi and Frechette, these experiments considered environments without noise; the 
introduction  of  noise  leads  more  information  sets  to  be  reached  and  so  makes  it  easier  to  distinguish 
between strategies.  
8  The  explicit  analysis  of  evolutionary  dynamics  becomes  quite  difficult  when  longer  memories  are 
possible. 
9 We used a continuation probability of 7/8, instead of the ½ and ¾ in Dal Bó and Frechette (2011), to 
investigate the extent to which players condition on observations before the previous round. When the 
continuation probability is ½, many interactions will last three or fewer rounds, which makes it hard to 
study how far back players look in choosing their actions. 5 
 
partner’s payoff and their own. To test this alternative hypothesis, we had subjects play a 
dictator game at the end of the session, with payoffs going to recipients recruited at a 
later experimental session, and we also asked subjects to fill out a post-experiment survey 
on attitudes and motivations. In another paper (Dreber, Fudenberg and David G. Rand 
2010) we explore this possibility; our main conclusion is that when the selfish payoffs 
strongly  support  cooperation,  social  preferences  do  not  seem  to  be  a  key  factor  in 
explaining who cooperates and what strategies they use. Leniency and forgiveness seem 
to be motivated by strategic concerns rather than social preferences. 
 
I.  Experimental Design 
The purpose of the experimental design is to test what happens when subjects 
play an infinitely repeated prisoner’s dilemma with error. The infinitely repeated game is 
induced  by  having  a  known  constant  probability  that  the  interaction  will  continue 
between two players following each round. We let the continuation probability be δ=7/8. 
With probability 1-δ, the interaction ends and subjects are informed that they have been 
re-matched with a new partner. There is also a known constant error probability that an 
intended move is changed to the opposite move. Our main conditions use E=1/8; we also 
ran control conditions with E=1/16 and E=0. Subjects were informed when their own 
move has been changed (i.e. when they make an error), but not when the other player’s 
move has been changed; they were only notified of the other player’s actual move, not 
the other’s intended move. Subjects were informed of all of the above in the experimental 
instructions, which are included in the online appendix. 
The  stage  game  is  the  prisoner’s  dilemma  in  Figure  1  where  the  payoffs  are 
denoted in points. Cooperation and defection take the “benefit/cost” (b/c) form, where 
cooperation means paying a cost c to give a benefit b to the other player, while defection 
gives  0  to  each  party;  b/c  took  the  values  1.5,  2,  2.5,  and  4  in  our  four  different 
treatments.
10 Subjects were presented with both the b/c representation and the resulting 
pre-error  payoff  matrix,  in  neutral  language  (the  choices  were  labeled  A  and  B  as 
opposed to the “C vs. D” choice that is standard in the prisoner’s dilemma). We used the 
                                                 
10 This payoff specification gives us a simple one-parameter ordering of the treatments; we do not think it is 
essential for our results. Note that the specification implies that the short-run gain to playing D instead of C 
is independent of the other player’s action. The prisoner’s dilemma is more general than this; its defining 
characteristics are that D is a dominant strategy and that both playing C yields the highest payoff - in 
particular both playing C should be more efficient than alternating between (C,D) and (D,C).  6 
 
exchange rate of 30 units = $1. Subjects were given a show-up fee of $10 plus their 
winnings from the repeated prisoner’s dilemma and an end-of session dictator game. To 
allow for negative stage-game payoffs, subjects began the session with an “endowment” 
of 50 units (in addition to the show–up fee).
11 On average subjects made $22 per session, 
with a range from $14 to $36. Sessions lasted approximately 90 minutes.
12 
A total of 384 subjects voluntarily participated at the Harvard Decision Science 
Laboratory in Cambridge, MA. In each session, 12-32 subjects interacted anonymously 
via  computer  using  the  software  Z-Tree  (Urs  Fischbacher  2007)  in  a  sequence  of 
infinitely  repeated  prisoner’s  dilemmas  (see  Table  1  for  summary  statistics  on  the 
different treatments). We conducted a total of 18 sessions between September 2009 and 
October 2010.
13 We only implemented one treatment during a given session, so each 
subject participated  in only one treatment. To rematch  subjects after the end of each 
repeated game, we used the turnpike protocol as in Dal Bó (2005). Subjects were divided 
into two equally-sized groups, A and B. A-subjects only interacted with B-subjects and 
vice versa, so that no subject ever played twice with another subject, or with a subject 
who has played with a subject they have played with, so that subjects could not influence 
the play of subjects they interacted with  in the future. 
14 Subjects were informed about 
this setup. To implement random game lengths we pre-generated a sequence of integers 
1 2 , ,.. t t according to the specified geometric distribution to use in all sessions, such that in 
each session every first interaction lasted  1 t  rounds, every second interaction lasted  2 t  
etc.
15  
                                                 
11 No subject ever had fewer than 19 units, and only 4 out of 278 subjects ever dropped below 40 units. 
12 Subjects were given at most 30 seconds to make their decision, and informed that after 30 seconds a 
random choice would be made. The average decision time was 1.3 seconds, much less than the 30 second 
limit, and the frequency of random decisions was very low, 0.0055. 
13 All sessions were conducted during the academic year, and all subjects were recruited through the CLER 
lab  at  Harvard  Business  School  using  the  same  recruitment  procedure.  Subject  demographics  varied 
relatively little across sessions and treatments. See online appendix for demographic summary statistics by 
session. 
14 Thus the maximum number of interactions in a session with N subjects was N/2, and in each session we 
ran the maximum number of interactions. This explains why the average number of interactions differs 
between  the  different  treatments.  The  average  numbers  of  interactions  per  subject  in  Table  1  are  not 
integers because there were multiple sessions per treatment. 
15 The starting place in the sequence of random game lengths that was used in the experiment was picked 
by the programmer, and the sequence following the chosen starting place had an unusually low number of 
short games. As a result the overall distribution of game lengths differed from what would be expected 
from  a  geometric  distribution,  which raises  the  concern  that  the  subjects  could  have  noticed  this  and 
adjusted  their  play.  However,  analysis  of  the  data  shows  that  subjects  did  not  become  less  likely  to 
cooperate in later rounds over the course of the session; see the online appendix for details.  7 
 
Figure 1. Payoff matrices for each specification. Payoffs are denoted in points. 
Realized payoffs    Expected payoffs 
             
b/c = 1.5      b/c = 1.5, E = 1/8   
  C  D      C  D 
C  1,1  -2,3    C  0.875, 0.875  -1.375, 2.375 
D  3,-2  0,0    D  2.375, -1.375  0.125, 0.125 
             
b/c = 2      b/c = 2, E = 1/8   
  C  D      C  D 
C  2,2  -2,4    C  1.75, 1.75  -1.25, 3.25 
D  4,-2  0,0    D  3.25, -1.25  0.25, 0.25 
             
b/c = 2.5      b/c = 2.5, E = 1/8   
  C  D      C  D 
C  3,3  -2,5    C  2.625, 2.625  -1.125, 4.125 
D  5,-2  0,0    D  4.125, -1.125  0.375, 0.375 
             
b/c = 4      b/c = 4, E = 1/8   
  C  D      C  D 
C  6,6  -2,8    C  5.25, 5.25  -0.75, 6.75 
D  8,-2  0,0    D  6.75, -0.75  0.75, 0.75 
             
        b/c = 4, E = 1/16   
          C  D 
        C  5.625, 5.625  -1.375, 7.375 
        D  7.375, -1.375  0.375, 0.375 
 
Table 1. Summary statistics for each treatment. 












Sessions per treatment  3  2  3  4  3  3 
Subjects per treatment  72  52  64  90  58  48 
Average number of 
interactions  11  11.5  10.7  11.3  9.9  7.8 
Average number of 
rounds per interaction  8.4  8.3  8.3  8.1  8.0  8.2 
 
Following the end of the series of repeated prisoner’s dilemmas, subjects played a 
dictator game and answered survey questions related to prosocial behavior, motivation, 8 
 
strategies  and  demographics  (see  Dreber,  Fudenberg  and  Rand  (2010)  for  more 
information).  
 
II.  Theoretical and Experimental Background  
  We begin by analyzing the set of equilibria of the various specifications. In all of 
the treatments, the only static equilibrium is to defect. In the treatment with b/c=1.5, the 
only  Nash  equilibrium  is  ALLD,  while  the  other  treatments  all  allow  cooperative 
equilibria.
16  As  there  are  no  explicit  characterization  theorems  for  the  entire  set  of 
equilibrium outcomes for noisy repeated games with fixed discount factors, our initial 
analysis  focused  on  a  few  repeated  game  strategies  that  have  previously  received 
attention.  
In particular, we chose the payoffs so that when b/c=4, the memory-1 strategy 
PTFT- “Play C if yesterday’s outcome was (C,C) or (D,D) and otherwise play D” -is an 
equilibrium.  This  strategy  has  received  a  great  deal  of  attention  in  the  literature  on 
evolutionary game theory, where it is called Win-Stay Loose-Shift (Nowak and Sigmund 
1993; Wedekind and Milinski 1996; Martin Posch 1999; Imhof, Fudenberg and Nowak 
2007). When both players use PTFT, one play of D (either intentionally or by mistake) 
leads to one round of (D,D) followed by a return to the equilibrium path; the strategy is 
called "perfect" because this error-correcting property allows it to be subgame-perfect, in 
contrast to TFT which typically is not.
17 PTFT has theoretical appeal because it is error-
correcting and has only memory 1, but we conjecture that most subjects will view it as 
counterintuitive to cooperate after mutual defection, which raises the question of how 
widely the strategy is actually used.
  
  Standard equilibrium analysis predicts no cooperation when b/c=1.5, but offers 
little  guidance  when  b/c  is  large  enough  that  there  are  cooperative  equilibria.  The 
evolutionary game theory models of Nowak and Sigmund (1993) and Imhof, Fudenberg 
and Nowak (2007) predict cooperation when b/c=4, and moreover predict that subjects 
will  play  PTFT.  Since  these  analyses  restrict  attention  to  strategies  that  base  their 
                                                 
16 Because the error term is strictly positive regardless of the actions played, every information set is 
reached with positive probability, and Nash equilibrium implies sequential rationality. Thus in the games 
with errors every Nash equilibrium is a sequential equilibrium, and every pure-strategy Nash equilibrium is 
equivalent to a perfect public equilibrium. 
17 In the game without errors, PTFT is a subgame-perfect equilibrium if  ( ) c b c δ < −  or  1/( / 1) b c δ > −  
which  is  the  case  when  b/c=2.5  or  4.  Analysis  of  the  game  with  errors  shows  that  PTFT  is  not  an 
equilibrium when b/c = 2 or 2.5, essentially because the errors lower the expected value of cooperation, but 
PTFT is an equilibrium of the game with errors when b/c=4. See the online appendix for details. 9 
 
decisions only on the last round's outcome, however, they predict defection when b/c=2 
or 2.5. The Fudenberg and Maskin (1990, 1994) evolutionary analysis of repeated games 
with vanishingly rare errors predicts cooperation in all three treatments with cooperative 
equilibria, but does not provide a precise prediction of what strategies will be played.  
  Experimental  work  on  repeated  games  without  errors  also  suggests  that 
cooperation is more likely when it is more beneficial, and in particular that the existence 
of an cooperative equilibrium is necessary but not sufficient for there to be a substantial 
amount of cooperation (e.g., Alvin E. Roth and J. Keith  Murnighan 1978; Murnighan 
and Roth 1983; Robert A. Feinberg and Thomas A. Husted 1993; Duffy and Ochs 2004; 
Dal Bó 2005; Dreber et al. 2008; Dal Bó and Frechette 2011; Matthias Blonski, Peter 
Ockenfels and Giancarlo Spagnolo 2011). Blonski and Spagnolo (2004) proposed that the 
key to whether cooperation occurs is whether TFT is a best response to a ½-½ probability 
distribution over TFT and ALLD, i.e. whether TFT risk-dominates ALLD in the game 
with only those two strategies.
18 Dal Bó and Frechette (2011) and Blonski, Ockenfels  
and Spagnolo (2011) find empirical support for this risk-dominance criterion in games 
without noise; and in a re-analysis of the no-noise experiments of Dreber et al. (2008), we 
find that the same criterion successfully predicts when cooperation is stable.  
The success of the  “risk dominance  by TFT” criterion  in  experiments without 
noise raises the question of whether a similar criterion will explain cooperation in games 
with noise.  One complication is that in our experiment, noise lowers the payoff of TFT 
against  itself  sufficiently  that  TFT  is  not  an  equilibrium  of  the  overall  game.
19  It  is 
however an equilibrium of the 2x2 game where players are restricted to play either TFT 
or ALLD; in this 2x2 game TFT is only risk dominant if b/c=2.5 or 4. Thus to the extent 
that the risk-dominance criterion extends to games with noise, it predicts substantially 
more cooperation when b/c=2.5 than when b/c=2. 
This combination of observations about equilibria of the game and insights from 
past experiments leads to our first set of experimental questions: 
 
                                                 
18 This is the case when the present value of cooperation is sufficiently high compared to the loss caused by 
one period of (C,D). Note that Blonski, Ockenfels and Spagnolo (2011) offer an alternative theoretical 
justification for this equilibrium selection criterion. 
19 See the online appendix for TFT equilibrium calculations. 10 
 
QUESTION 1: Is cooperation more frequent in treatments where there are cooperative 
equilibria? Is risk dominance of TFT over ALLD a good predictor of cooperation?  
  
QUESTION 2: Is there substantially more cooperation when cooperation is the outcome 
of an equilibrium in strategies which base their play on outcomes in the previous round? 
 
The answers to questions 1 and 2 provide some indirect evidence on the strategies 
that subjects use. To get a more precise understanding of the particular strategies being 
employed by subjects, we examine more direct evidence on their play. This leads to our 
four additional experimental questions: 
 
QUESTION 3: What strategies do subjects use  in the  noisy  prisoner’s dilemma? Do 
subjects use PTFT when it is an equilibrium strategy? 
 
QUESTION 4: How do the strategies used vary with the gains to cooperation? 
 
QUESTION 5: How do the strategies used vary with the level of noise? 
 
III.  Methodology 
The general theory of repeated games, like that of extensive form games, views 
strategies as complete contingent plans, which specify how the player will act in every 
possible  information  state. In practice, cognitive constraints  may  lead subjects to use 
relatively simple strategies, corresponding to automata with a small number of internal 
states. However, it is unclear what a priori restrictions one should impose on subjects’ 
strategies, and one of the goals of our experiment is to let the data reveal what sorts of 
strategies are actually used. For this reason we did not want to use the “strategy method,” 
where subjects are asked to pick a strategy that is implemented for them: The full set of 
strategies is infinite, so forcing subjects to choose a strategy that depends only on the 
previous  round’s  outcome  (memory-1)  is  much  too  restrictive  while  allowing  for  all 
strategies that depend on the last two periods (memory-2) gives too large a strategy set to 
explicitly present. In addition, we would like to consider some simple strategies such as 
Grim, which can be viewed as a two-state automata but has arbitrarily long memory, as 
its current play depends on whether "D" was played in any previous round. As the data 11 
 
cannot discriminate between all possible repeated game strategies, we used a combination 
of prior intuition, survey responses and data analysis to identify a small set of strategies 
that seem to best describe actual play.  
There  has  been  comparatively  little  past  work  on  identifying  the  strategies 
subjects  use  in  repeated  game  experiments.  In  the  repeated  prisoner’s  dilemma, 
Wedekind and Milinski (1996) note that subjects rarely play C in the round after they 
played  D  and  the  opponent  played  C,  and  take  this  as  evidence  of  PTFT,  but  since 
subjects rarely played C following (D,D), their data seems more consistent with some 
sort of grim strategy. Dal Bó and Frechette (2011) used maximum likelihood to estimate 
the proportions of subjects using one of six ex-ante relevant strategies. They find that 
ALLD and TFT account for the majority of their data. Aoyagi and Frechette (2009) study 
experimental play of a prisoner’s dilemma where subjects do not observe their partner’s 
actions but instead observe a noisy symmetric signal of it. The signal is a real number, 
and  has  the  same  distribution  under  (C,D)  and  (D,C),  so  that  commonly  discussed 
prisoner’s dilemma strategies such as TFT are not implementable. They find that subjects 
play “trigger strategies” of memory 1, except in the limit no-noise case where signals 
from two rounds ago also have an impact. Engle-Warnick and Slonim (2006) study the 
strategies  used  in  a  repeated  sequential-move  trust  game  by  counting  how  many 
observations of a subject’s play in a given interaction is exactly described by a given 
strategy. They find that in most of the interactions, the investors choose actions which are 
consistent with a grim trigger strategy, while the play of the trustees is more diverse. 
Gabriele Camera, Marco Casari and Maria Bigoni (2010) on the other hand find little 
evidence of grim trigger strategies on the subject level when subjects are randomly put in 
groups of four to play an indefinitely repeated PD where in each round they are randomly 
matched with one subject in the group. Even though behavior at the aggregate looks like 
grim trigger, individual behavior is far more heterogeneous. 
An advantage of studying repeated games with errors is that we can more easily 
identify different strategies: In the absence of errors a number of repeated game strategies 
are observationally equivalent, for example if a pair of subjects cooperates with each 
other in every round, we see no data on how they would have responded to defections. 
Thus the introduction of errors has a methodological advantage as well as a substantive 
one, as the errors will lead more histories to occur and thus make it easier to distinguish 
between histories.  12 
 
To have any hope of inferring the subjects’ strategies from their play, we must 
focus our attention on a subset of the infinitely many repeated game strategies. We begin 
with strategies that have received particular attention in the theoretical literature: ALLD, 
ALLC, Grim
20, TFT, and PTFT. Because one round of punishment is only enough to 
sustain  cooperation  in  one  of  our  four  treatments  (when  b/c=4)  we  also  include 
modifications of TFT and PTFT that react to D with two rounds of defection, we call 
these 2TFT and 2PTFT. We also include the strategy T2 used by Dal Bó and Frechette 
(2011).
21  
To inform our extension of this strategy set, we asked subjects to describe their 
strategies  in  a  post-experimental  survey.  Several  regularities  emerged  from  these 
descriptions. Many subjects reported ‘giving the benefit of the doubt’ to an opponent on 
the  first  defection,  assuming  that  it  was  a  result  of  noise  rather  than  purposeful 
malfeasance; only after two or three defections by their partner would they switch to 
defection themselves.
22 We refer to this slow-to-anger behavior as ‘leniency’. None of the 
strategies mentioned above are lenient; note that leniency requires looking further into the 
past than permitted by memory-1 strategies. Subjects also varied in the extent to which 
they reported being willing to return to cooperation following a partner’s defection. We 
refer to this strategic feature as ‘forgiveness’, which is an often-discussed aspect of TFT 
(as  opposed  to  Grim,  for  example);  2TFT  also  shows  forgiveness,  as  do  PTFT  and 
2PTFT, although only following mutual defection.  
In  response  to  the  subjects’  strategy  descriptions,  we  added  several  lenient 
strategies to our analysis. Because our games were on average only 8 rounds in length, 
we have limited power to explore intermediate levels of forgiveness between TFT and 
Grim, so we restrict strategies to either forgive after 1 to 3 rounds or to never forgive (as 
with Grim and its lenient variants).
23 
                                                 
20 As in Dal Bó & Frechette (2011), our specification of Grim begins by playing C and then switches 
permanently to D as soon as either player defects. 
21 2TFT initially plays C, then afterwards plays C if opponent has never played D or if the opponent played 
C  in  both  of  the  previous  two  rounds.  A  defection  by  the  partner  triggers  two  rounds  of  punishment 
defection in both 2TFT and T2. However, T2 automatically returns to C following the two Ds, regardless of 
the partner’s play during this time, while 2TFT only returns to C if the partner played C in both of the 
“punishment  rounds.”  Additionally,  T2  begins  its  punishment  if  either  player  defects,  whereas  2TFT 
responds only to the partner’s defection. 
22 Subjects’ free-response descriptions of their strategies are reproduced in the online appendix. 
23 More generally the average length of 8 interactions imposes restrictions on our ability to estimate the 
extent to which subjects condition on long histories. This constraint reflects a tradeoff between our interest 
in the way subjects use past history and our desire to limit sessions to 90 minutes (to avoid fatiguing the 13 
 
As strategies that are both lenient and forgiving, we include TFT variants that 
switch  to  defection  only  after  the  other  player  chooses  D  multiple  times  in  a  row, 
considering TF2T (plays D if the partner’s last two moves were both D) and TF3T (plays 
D  if  the  partner’s  last  three  moves  were  D).  For  strategies  that  are  lenient  but  not 
forgiving, we include Grim variants that wait for multiple rounds of D (by either player) 
before switching permanently to defection, considering Grim2 (waits for two consecutive 
rounds  in  which  either  player  played  D)  and  Grim3  (waits  for  three  consecutive  D 
rounds). We include three strategies that punish twice (intermediate to TFT’s one round 
of  punishment  and  Grim’s  unending  punishment)  but  can  be  implemented  by 
conditioning only on the last 3 rounds. These are T2 and 2TFT, which were discussed 
above, and 2TF2T (“2 Tits for 2 Tats”), which waits for the partner to play D twice in a 
row, and then punishes by playing D twice in a row. Because we do not include strategies 
that punish for a finite number of rounds greater than two, our estimated share of “Grim” 
strategies may include some subjects who use such strategies with more than two rounds 
of punishment.  
Other subjects indicated that they used strategies which tried to take advantage of 
the leniency of others by defecting initially and then switching to cooperation. Thus we 
consider ‘exploitive’ versions of our main cooperative strategies that defect on the first 
move and then return to the strategy as normally specified: D-TFT
24, D-TF2T, D-TF3T, 
D-Grim2 and D-Grim3.
25 Because TF2T appears prevalent in many treatments, we also 
looked at whether subjects used the strategy that alternates between D and C (DC-Alt), as 
this  strategy  exploits  the  leniency  and  forgiveness  of  TF2T.  Lastly,  some  subjects 
reported playing strategies which give the first impression of being cooperative and then 
switch to defection, hoping the partner will assume the subsequent Ds are due to error. 
Therefore we include a strategy which plays C in the first round and D thereafter (C-to-
ALLD). Each strategy is described verbally in Table 2; complete descriptions are given in 
the online appendix.  
                                                                                                                                            
subjects) while allowing them to play enough interactions to have some chance to learn. Fortunately the 
average length of 8 was enough to provide convincing evidence that subjects can use forgiving strategies 
with memory greater than 1.  
24 Boyd and Jeffrey P. Lorberbaum (1987) call this strategy “Suspicious Tit for Tat.” 
25  ALLD  and  D-Grim are  identical  except  when  the  other player  plays  C  in the  first round, and  you 
mistakenly also play C in the first round: here D-Grim cooperates while ALLD defects. Thus we do not 
include  D-Grim  in  our  analysis  as  we  do  not  have  sufficient  number  of  observations  per  subject  to 
differentiate between the two. 14 
 
 
Table 2. Descriptions of the 20 strategies considered. 
Strategy  Abbreviation  Description 
Always Cooperate  ALLC  Always play C 
Tit-for-Tat  TFT  Play C unless partner played D last round 
Tit-for-2-Tats  TF2T  Play C unless partner played D in both of the 
last 2 rounds 
Tit-for-3-Tats  TF3T  Play C unless partner played D in all of the 
last 3 rounds 
2-Tits-for-1-Tat  2TFT  Play C unless partner played D in either of 
the last 2 rounds (2 rounds of punishment if 
partner plays D) 
2-Tits-for-2-Tats  2TF2T  Play C unless partner played 2 consecutive 
Ds in the last 3 rounds (2 rounds of 
punishment if partner plays D twice in a row) 
T2  T2  Play C until either player plays D, then play 
D twice and return to C (regardless of all 
actions during the punishment rounds) 
Grim  Grim  Play C until either player plays D, then play 
D forever 
Lenient Grim 2  Grim2  Play C until 2 consecutive rounds occur in 
which either player played D, then play D 
forever 
Lenient Grim 3  Grim3  Play C until 3 consecutive rounds occur in 
which either player played D, then play D 
forever 
Perfect Tit-for-Tat / Win-Stay-
Lose-Shift 
PTFT  Play C if both players chose the same move 
last round, otherwise play D 
Perfect Tit-for-Tat with 2 
rounds of punishment 
2PTFT  Play C if both players played C in the last 2 
rounds, both players played D in the last 2 
rounds, or both players played D 2 rounds 
ago and C last round. Otherwise play D 
Always Defect  ALLD  Always play D 
False cooperator  C-to-ALLD  Play C in the first round, then D forever 
Exploitive Tit-for-Tat  D-TFT  Play D in the first round, then play TFT 
Exploitive Tit-for-2-Tats  D-TF2T  Play D in the first round, then play TF2T 
Exploitive Tit-for-3-Tats  D-TF3T  Play D in the first round, then play TF3T 
Exploitive Grim2  D-Grim2  Play D in the first round, then play Grim2 
Exploitive Grim3  D-Grim3  Play D in the first round, then play Grim3 
Alternator  DC-Alt  Start with D, then alternate between C and D 
 
 
  To assess the prevalence of each  strategy  in our data, we follow Dal  Bó and 
Frechette (2011) and suppose that each subject chooses a fixed strategy at the beginning 
of the session (or alternatively for the last four interactions, when we restrict attention to 15 
 
those  observations)
26,  and  moreover  that  in  addition  to  the  extrinsically  imposed 
execution error, subjects make mistakes when choosing their intended action, so every 
sequence  of  choices  (e.g.  of  intended  actions)  has  positive  probability.
27  More 
specifically, we suppose that if subject i uses strategy s, her chosen action in round r of 
interaction k is C if  ( ) 0 ikr ikr s s + ≥ γε , where  ( ) 1 ikr s s = if strategy s says to play C in 
round r of interaction k given the history to that point, and  ( ) 1 ikr s s = −  if s says to play 
D. Here  ikr ε  is an error term that is independent across subjects, rounds, interactions, and 
histories, γ  parameterizes the probability of mistakes, and the density of the error term is 
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where  ikr y  is 1 if the subject chose C and 0 if the subject chose D. 
28 
To  better  understand  the  mechanics  of  the  specification,  suppose  that  an 
interaction lasts w rounds, that in the first round the subject chose C, the first round 
outcome was that the subject played C and her partner played D, and in the second round 
the subject chose D. Then for strategy s = TFT, which plays C in the first round, and 
plays D in the second round following (C,D), the likelihood of the subject’s play is the 
probability of two “no-error” draws. This is the same probability that we would assign to 
the overall sequence of the subject’s play given the play of the opponent - it makes no 
difference  whether  we  compute  the  likelihood  round  by  round  or  for  the  whole 
interaction. 
For any given set of strategies S and proportions p¸ we then derive the likelihood 
for  the  entire  sample,  namely  ( ) ln ( ) ( ) i I s S p s p s
∈ ∑ ∑ .  Note  that  the  specification 
assumes that all subjects are ex-ante identical with the same probability distribution over 
                                                 
26 We found that conducting the MLE supposing that subjects pick a fixed strategy at the beginning of each 
interaction, as opposed to using the same strategy throughout the session, gave qualitatively similar results 
to those presented below. 
27 Recall that we, unlike our subjects, observe the intended actions as well as the implemented ones. We use 
this more informative data in our estimates.  
28  Thus  the  probability  of  an  error  in  implementing  one’s  strategy  is  1/(1+exp(1/γ)).  Note  that  this 
represents error in intention, rather than the experimentally imposed error in execution. This formulation 
assumes that all strategies have an equal rate of implementation error. In the online appendix we show that 
the MLE estimates of strategy shares are robust to allowing each strategy have a different value of γ. 16 
 
strategies and the same distribution over errors; one could relax this at the cost of adding 
more  parameters.  Because  p  describes  a  distribution  over  strategies,  this  likelihood 
function implies that in a very large sample we expect fraction p(s) of subjects to use 
strategy s, though for finite samples there will be a non-zero variance in the population 
shares. We use maximum likelihood estimation (MLE) to estimate the prevalence of the 
various  strategies,  and  bootstrapping  to  associate  standard  errors  with  each  of  our 
frequency estimates. We construct 100 bootstrap samples for each treatment by randomly 
sampling the appropriate number of subjects with replacement. We then determine the 
standard  deviation  of  the  MLE  estimates  for  each  strategy  frequency  across  the  100 
bootstrap samples. 
To investigate the validity of this estimation procedure, we tested it on simulated 
data. For a given strategy frequency distribution, we assigned strategies to 3 groups of 20 
computer agents. We then generated a simulated history of play across 4 interactions by 
randomly pairing members of each group to play games with representative lengths from 
the game length sequence used in the experiment (t1=5, t2=11, t3=8, t4=9). As in the main 
experimental treatments, we included a 1/8 probability of error, and recorded both the 
intended and actual action of each agent. We generated simulated data in this way using 
strategy distributions similar to those estimated from the experimental data (see Table 3), 
and then used the MLE method described above to estimate the strategy frequencies. The 




IV.  Results 
 
  We begin by examining behavior in the 4 treatments with E=1/8; we will then 
compare this to the behavior in the controls with E=0 and E=1/16 using b/c=4, which is 
the ratio most favorable to cooperation.  
Examining play in the first round of each interaction, as displayed in Figure 2, 
suggests that there was some learning, except perhaps  when b/c=1.5; this is confirmed by 
the statistical analysis reported in Appendix B. To reduce the potential effects of learning 
while striking a balance with the need for data, our analysis will focus on how subjects 
                                                 
29 See Appendix A for MLE results using simulated data. 17 
 




Figure 2. First round cooperation over the course of the session, by payoff specification. 
 
QUESTION 1: Is cooperation more frequent in treatments where there are cooperative 
equilibria? Is risk dominance of TFT over ALLD a good predictor of cooperation?  
Figure 3 reports both cooperation in the first round of the last 4 interactions and 
the average cooperation over the last 4 interactions as a whole, which can depend on the 
relationship between the two subjects’ strategies and also on possible random errors.
31 
We see that there is markedly less cooperation when b/c=1.5, both in the first round (1.5 
vs. 2, p=0.016; 1.5 vs. 2.5, p=0.003; 1.5 vs. 4, p=0.004) and overall (1.5 vs. 2, p=0.001; 
1.5 vs. 2.5, p<0.001; 1.5 vs. 4, p<0.001). Conversely, we see little difference in first 
round cooperation between the three treatments with cooperative equilibria (2 vs. 2.5, 
p=0.71; 2 vs. 4, p=0.83; 2.5 vs. 4, p=0.87); and while there is an increase in overall 
cooperation  going  from  b/c=2  to  b/c=2.5,  this  increase  is  smaller  than  that  between 
b/c=1.5 and b/c=2 and is only marginally significant (p=0.058). Moreover there is no 
significant difference in overall cooperation between b/c=2.5 and b/c=4 (p=0.73). The 
reason  there  is  about  the  same  amount  of  initial  cooperation  in  b/c=2  and  2.5  yet 
somewhat more overall cooperation in the latter case seems related to the fact that more 
subjects are more forgiving in the latter treatment, as seen in the discussion of Questions 
                                                 
30 Our results are not sensitive to this particular cutoff. Using either the last 6 or last 2 interactions instead 
yields very similar results. See the online appendix for details. 
31  For  each  pairwise  b/c  comparison,  we  report  the results  of  a  logistic  regression  over  first-round/all 
individual decisions, with a b/c value dummy as the independent variable, clustered on both subject and 
interaction pair. 18 
 
3-4. Because the largest difference in cooperation occurs between b/c=1/5 and b/c=2, as 
opposed to between b/c=2 and b/c=2.5, the data do not show the strong support for risk 
dominance of TFT as the key determinant of the level of cooperation in games with noise 
that was seen in studies of games without noise. 
 
 
Figure 3. First round and overall cooperation by payoff specification, averaged over the 
last 4 interactions of each session. See Table 4 for a list of the cooperation frequencies 
displayed here. Error bars indicate standard error of the mean, clustered on subject and 
interaction pair. 
  
QUESTION 2: Is there substantially more cooperation when cooperation is the outcome 
of an equilibrium in strategies which base their play on outcomes in previous round? 
 
Indeed, we see a substantial amount of cooperation when b/c=2 and 2.5, even 
though cooperative equilibria in these treatments require memory 2 or more.
32 To the 
extent that play resembles an equilibrium of the repeated game, these results are a first 
sign that the predictions of the memory-1 restriction are not consistent with the data. 
 
QUESTION 3: What strategies do subjects use  in the  noisy  prisoner’s dilemma? Do 
subjects use PTFT when it is an equilibrium strategy? 
 
                                                 
32 This theoretical result is robust to considering memory-1 strategies which forget the state with some non-
zero probability. Regardless of the probability of forgetting, TFT and PTFT are not equilibria at E=1/8 and 
b/c=2 or b/c=2.5. See the online appendix for further discussion. 19 
 
We now report the results of the MLE analysis of strategy choice, examining the 
last 4 interactions of each session.
33 We consider 20 strategies in total (Table 2): the fully 
cooperative strategies ALLC, TFT, TF2T, TF3T, 2TFT, 2TF2T, Grim, Grim2, Grim3, 
PTFT, 2PTFT and T2, which always play C against themselves in the absence of errors; 
the  fully  non-cooperative  strategies  ALLD and  D-TFT, which always play  D against 
themselves in the absence of errors; and the partially cooperative strategies C-to-ALLD, 
D-TF2T, D-TF3T, D-Grim2, D-Grim3 and DC-Alt, which play a combination of C and D 
against themselves in the absence of error.
34 Of these, only 11 are present at frequencies 
significantly greater than 0 in at least one payoff specification: the cooperative strategies 
ALLC,  TFT,  TF2T,  TF3T,  2TFT,  2TF2T,  Grim,  Grim2  and  Grim3,  and  the  non-
cooperative strategies ALLD and D-TFT.
35  
 Thus we restrict our attention to these 11 strategies (Table 3). We do not find any 
evidence of subjects using PTFT in any payoff specification - PTFT never received a 
positive weight in any of the bootstrapped samples. In the treatments with cooperative 
equilibria, the most common cooperative strategies TF2T, TF3T, Grim2 and Grim3 are 
all lenient. 
                                                 
33 Analysis of simulated data suggests that MLE on 4 interactions lasting on average 8 rounds detects 
strategies whose frequencies are 5% or higher, but that lower-frequency strategies may not be detected.  
34  Following  Dal  Bo  and  Frechette,  we  consider  only  pure  strategies  in  the  MLE  estimation.  The 
evolutionary game theory literature suggests the consideration of “generous tit-for-tat” or GTFT (Nowak 
and Sigmund 1990), which cooperates with probability strictly between 0 and 1 if the partner defected last 
period, and otherwise cooperates. Simulations show that this strategy will be identified by our estimation as 
playing TF3T, but that expanding our MLE procedure to include stochastic strategies can differentiate 
GTFT from TF3T. Doing so suggests that the majority of leniency observed in our data is not in fact the 
result of stochastic memory-1 strategies, but is rather due to lenient strategies with longer memories. The 
online appendix reports these results, which should be viewed as a first step towards understanding how to 
test for mixed strategies; we hope to explore the issues posed by mixed strategies in greater detail in future 
work. 
35 See Appendix C for the estimates and standard errors for the full set of 20 strategies. At the request of the 
referees,  we  also  explored  versions  of  TFT  and  PTFT  which  forget  the  state  with  some  non-zero 
probability, versions of TFT and Grim which ignore a defection in the first round, and a family of strategies 
which cooperate until the fraction of D by their partner passes some threshold. None of these strategies 
were present at frequencies significantly greater than 0. See the online appendix for the details of these 
robustness checks. 20 
 
Table 3. Maximum likelihood estimates using the last 4 interactions of each session. All 
payoff  specifications  use  error  rate  E=1/8.  Bootstrapped  standard  errors  (shown  in 
parentheses) used to calculate p-values.  
† Significant at p<0.1, * Significant at p<0.05, ** Significant at p<0.01. 
 
             
     b/c=1.5  b/c=2  b/c=2.5  b/c=4   
  ALLC  0  0.03  0  0.06†   
     (0)  (0.03)  (0.02)  (0.03)   
  TFT  0.19**  0.06  0.09*  0.07*   
     (0.05)  (0.04)  (0.04)  (0.03)   
  TF2T  0.05  0  0.17*  0.20**   
     (0.03)  (0)  (0.06)  (0.07)   
  TF3T  0.01  0.03  0.05  0.09*   
     (0.01)  (0.03)  (0.05)  (0.04)   
  2TFT  0.06  0.07†  0.02  0.03   
     (0.04)  (0.04)  (0.02)  (0.02)   
  2TF2T  0  0.11*  0.11†  0.12*   
     (0.02)  (0.05)  (0.06)  (0.05)   
  Grim  0.14**  0.07  0.11*  0.04†   
     (0.04)  (0.05)  (0.04)  (0.02)   
  Grim2  0.06†  0.18**  0.02  0.05†   
     (0.03)  (0.06)  (0.03)  (0.03)   
  Grim3  0.06  0.28**  0.24**  0.11**   
     (0.03)  (0.08)  (0.07)  (0.04)   
  ALLD  0.29**  0.17**  0.14**  0.23**   
     (0.06)  (0.06)  (0.04)  (0.04)   
  D-TFT  0.14**  0  0.05†  0   
     (0.05)  (0)  (0.03)  (0)   
  Gamma  0.46**  0.5**  0.49**  0.43**   
     (0.02)  (0.03)  (0.03)  (0.02)   
             
 
Note that in all treatments the MLE assigns a substantial share to strategies that 
depend on outcomes from more than one period ago. To provide additional evidence for 
this conclusion, we use a logistic regression to test whether subjects condition play on 
their  partner's  decision  two  rounds  ago.  Bias  introduced  by  heterogeneity  presents  a 
potential challenge for this approach: the other's play two rounds ago interacts with own 
play two rounds ago to determine the history in the previous round, so other's play two 
rounds ago could have a spuriously significant coefficient in a heterogeneous population 
of  subjects  all  of  whom  use  memory  1  strategies.  To  control  for  bias  introduced  by 
heterogeneity, we include controls for the type of the player making the decision, as in 21 
 
Aoyagi & Frechette (2009).
36 We conduct a logistic regression with correlated random 
effects, regressing own decision in round t against own play in round t-1, other's play in t-
1, own play in t-2 and other's play in t-2, and including controls for b/c ratio and own 
average frequency of first round cooperation and overall cooperation, both over the last 4 
interactions.
37 Consistent with the use of longer memories, we find a significant effect of 
other's play two rounds ago (coeff=1.01, p<0.001). This result supports the conclusion 
that many subjects are conditioning on more than only the last round. 
 
QUESTION 4: How do the strategies used vary with the gains to cooperation? 
 
The  strategies  employed  by  subjects  clearly  vary  according  to the  gains  from 
cooperation. This can be seen from descriptive statistics analyzing aggregate behavior as 
well as from the MLE analysis, both of which are summarized in Table 4. Three trends 
are apparent. 
First, cooperation is significantly lower at b/c=1.5 than at the higher b/c ratios, as 
shown in Table 4 and visualized in Figure 3. Consistent with this observation, Table 4 
also shows that the share of the non-cooperative strategies ALLD and D-TFT is 43% 
when b/c=1.5, which is substantially and significantly higher than in other b/c conditions 
(b/c=2, 17%, p<0.001; b/c=2.5, 19%, p<0.001; b/c=4, 23%, p=0.001).
38  
Second,  leniency  also  increases  when  moving  from  b/c=1.5  to  the  higher  b/c 
ratios. To get a measure of leniency distinct from the MLE estimates, we examine all 
histories  in which  both subjects played C  in all but the previous round, while  in the 
previous round one subject played D.
39 We then ask how frequently the subject who had 
hitherto  cooperated  showed  leniency  by  continuing  to  cooperate  despite  the  partner’s 
                                                 
36 For a general treatment of the topic, see Gary Chamberlain (1980) and James J. Heckman (1981). 
37 When we simulate data for various combinations of memory-1 strategies, we find that this regression 
returns a significant coefficient on partner’s action in t-2 no more often than predicted by chance. We also 
find that when simulating only memory-1 strategies, the size of the estimated coefficient of play two rounds 
ago is at least an order of magnitude smaller than the coefficients for play last round, in contrast to the 
estimates on the experimental data; see the online appendix for a detailed discussion of these issues. Note 
that as the regression conditions on play two rounds ago, it necessarily omits decisions made in the first two 
rounds of each interaction.  
38 For each pairwise comparison of aggregated MLE coefficients, we report the results of a two-sample t-
test using bootstrapped standard errors of the aggregated coefficients.  
39 We also include second round decisions in which the first round’s outcome was CD. 22 
 
defection.
40 At b/c=1.5, 17% of histories show leniency, compared to the significantly 
higher values of 63% at b/c=2 (b/c=1.5 vs. b/c=2, p=0.001), 67% at b/c=2.5 (b/c=1.5 vs. 
b/c=2.5,  p<0.001)  and  66%  at  b/c=4  (b/c=1.5  vs.  b/c=4,  p<0.001).  No  significant 
difference in leniency exists among the higher b/c ratios (p>0.20 for all comparisons). 
Thus leniency increases across the transition from b/c=1.5 to b/c=2. Analyzing strategy 
frequencies paints a similar picture. The combined frequency of the lenient strategies 
ALLC, TF2T, TF3T, 2TF2T, Grim2 and Grim3 is 18% at b/c=1.5 which is significantly 
less than at b/c=2 (62%, p<0.001), b/c=2.5 (60%, p<0.001) or b/c=4 (63%, p<0.001). 
 
Table  4.  Descriptive  statistics  of  aggregate  behavior,  as  well  as  aggregated  MLE 
frequencies  from  Table  3.  All  specifications  use  E=1/8.  The  descriptive  statistics  for 
leniency and forgiveness are defined in the text. For MLE aggregation, all strategies 
other than ALLD and D-TFT are cooperative; lenient strategies are TF2T, TF3T, 2TF2T, 






             
     b/c=1.5  b/c=2  b/c=2.5  b/c=4   
  Descriptive statistics   
  %C First Round  54%  75%  79%  76%   
  %C All Rounds  32%  49%  61%  59%   
  Leniency  29%  63%  67%  66%   
  Forgiveness  15%  18%  33%  32%   
  MLE aggregation   
  Cooperative strategies  57%  83%  81%  77%   
   Lenient strategies  18%  62%  60%  63%   
  Forgiving strategies  31%  29%  44%  57%   
             
 
The gains to cooperation also influence the frequency of forgiveness. Forgiveness 
is more complicated to define and measure, as it describes a more complex pattern of 
behavior: to us it means that the players were initially cooperating, that one of them then 
defects  leading  the  other  player  to  "punish"  the  initial  defector,  and  finally  that  the 
punishing player relents and returns to cooperation. To develop an operational measure of 
histories where forgiveness occurs, we first identify all histories in which (i) at least one 
subject  chose  C  in  the  first  round,  (ii)  in  at  least  one  previous  round,  the  initially 
cooperative subject chose C while the other subject chose D and (iii) in the immediately 
                                                 
40 For each pairwise b/c comparison of aggregate descriptive statistics, we report the results of a logistic 
regression over all decisions in lenient/forgiving histories, with a b/c dummy as the independent variable, 
clustered on both subject and interaction pair. 23 
 
previous round the formerly cooperative subject played D. We then ask how frequently 
this formerly cooperative subject showed forgiveness by returning to C.  For example, if 
the outcome in the first round is (C,D), and  the first player plays D in the second round, 
and C in the third, we would say that the first player had “forgiven” the second player. 
We find significantly less forgiveness at b/c=1.5 (15%) and b/c=2 (18%) compared to 
b/c=2.5 (33%) and b/c=4 (32%) (1.5 vs. 2.5, p<0.001; 1.5 vs. 4, p<0.001; 2 vs. 2.5, 
p=0.008; 2 vs. 4, p=0.007). Thus forgiveness increases significantly when b/c increases 
from 2 to 2.5. This is again confirmed by examining strategy frequencies in the payoff 
specifications  that  support  cooperation.  The  forgiving  strategies  ALLC,  TFT,  TF2T, 
TF3T, 2TFT and 2TF2T are less common at b/c=1.5 (31%) and b/c=2 (29%) than at 
b/c=2.5 (44%) and b/c=4 (57%) (1.5 vs. 2.5, p=0.061; 1.5 vs. 4, p<0.001; 2 vs. 2.5, 
p=0.054; 2 vs. 4, p<0.001; 2.5 vs. 4, p=0.054).  
 
QUESTION 5: How do the strategies used vary with the level of noise? 
 
  To  explore  how  play  varies  with  the  error  rate,  we  now  examine  our  two 
additional control treatments using b/c=4 with E=1/16 and E=0, and compare them to our 
results using b/c=4 at E=1/8. We begin by asking whether subjects condition on their 
partner’s play two rounds ago in the last 4 interactions of each session, using a logistic 
regression with correlated random effects and regressing own decision in round t against 
other’s play in round t-2, own play in t-2, other’s play in t-1, own play in t-1, own first 
round cooperation frequency in the last 4 interactions and own frequency of cooperation 
in all rounds of the last 4 interactions. As with the E=1/8 treatments, we find a highly 
significant  and  sizable  dependence  on  other’s  play  two  rounds  ago  for  E=1/16 
(coeff=1.221,  p<0.001);  while  in  the  no-error  E=0  control,  however,  we  find  no 
significant  dependence  on  other’s  play  two  rounds  ago  (coeff=0.387,  p=0.247).  This 
provides our first direct evidence that the presence of noise plays an important role in 
strategy selection, promoting more complicated strategies. 
Next  we  present  the  MLE  results  for  each  strategy
  in  Table  5,  as  well  as 
aggregated  MLE  results  and  descriptive  statistics  in  Table  6.  As  shown  in  Table  6,  
overall cooperation is lower at E=1/8 (59%) than in the lower error conditions, and these 24 
 
differences are statistically significant  (E=1/16, 82%, p<0.001; E=0, 78%, p=0.002)
41. 
Considering cooperation in the first round, there is somewhat less cooperation at E=1/8, 
but the differences are smaller and either not significant or just marginally so (E=1/8, 
76%, E=1/16, 87%, E=0, 83%; 1/8 vs. 1/16, p=0.050, 1/8 vs. 0, p=0.346). We find no 
significant difference at E=0 compared to E=1/16 in either overall cooperation (p=0.486) 
or first round cooperation (p=0.338). Complementing this aggregate analysis, the share of 
the non-cooperative strategies ALLD and D-TFT is significantly larger at E=1/8 (23%) 
compared  to  E=1/16  (11%,  p=0.001),  and  larger  at  E=1/8 than  E=0  (16%,  p=0.191) 
although the difference  between E=0 and E=1/8  is  not significant.
42 There is also no 
significant difference between E=0 and E=1/16 (p=0.297). 
Turning to leniency, we examine cooperation frequency in the subset of histories 
in which leniency is possible, as described above in response to Question 5. At E=0, 42% 
of the eligible histories show leniency, compared to the significantly higher value of 77% 
at  E=1/16  (p=0.001)  and  the  marginally  significantly  higher  value  of  66%  at  E=1/8 
(p=0.052).  We  also  find  that  marginally  significantly  more  eligible  histories  showed 
leniency  at  E=1/16  than  at  E=1/8  (p=0.071).  We  see  similar  results  when  analyzing 
strategy frequencies. The combined frequency of lenient strategies ALLC, TF2T, TF3T, 
2TF2T, Grim2 and Grim3  is significantly  lower at E=0 (40%) than at E=1/16 (82%, 
p<0.001)  or  E=1/8  (63%,  p<0.001).  As  with  the  analysis  of  histories,  we  also  see 
significantly more leniency at E=1/16 than at E=1/8 (p<0.001). 
Considering cooperation frequency in histories with the potential for forgiveness, 
as  described  above  in  the  response  to  Question  5  we  also  see  significantly  less 
forgiveness at E=0 (19%) compared to E=1/16 (47%, p<0.001) or E=1/8 (32%, p<0.001). 
We  find  no  significant  difference  in  forgiveness  between  E=1/16  than  at  E=1/8 
(p=0.298). Examining the aggregated MLE frequencies, the forgiving strategies ALLC, 
TFT, TF2T, TF3T, 2TFT and 2TF2T are less common at E=0 (52%) compared to E=1/16 
(78%,  p=0.007)  and  at  E=1/8  (57%)  compared  to  E=1/16  (p=0.001).  There  is  no 
significant difference between forgiving strategies at E=0 and E=1/8 (p=0.670).  
                                                 
41  For  each  pairwise  comparison  of  aggregate  descriptive  statistics,  we  report  the results  of  a  logistic 
regression over all decisions in lenient/forgiving histories, with an error rate dummy as the independent 
variable, clustered on both subject and interaction pair. 
42 For each pairwise comparison of aggregated MLE coefficients, we report the results of a two-sample t-
test using bootstrapped standard errors of the aggregated coefficients.  25 
 
In summary, we find that substantial levels of leniency and forgiveness are not 
unique to the high error rate of E=1/8, but are also present at the lower error rate of 
E=1/16.  When  the  error  rate  is  zero,  leniency  is  much  less  frequent.  The  somewhat 
greater leniency and forgiveness at E=1/16 compared to E=1/8 is surprising; investigating 
this issue further is an interesting topic for future study. 
 
Table 5. Maximum likelihood estimates for our E=0, E=1/16 and E=1/8 conditions using 
the  last  4  interactions  of  each  session.  All  specifications  use  b/c=4.  Bootstrapped 
standard errors (shown in parentheses) used to calculate p-values.  
† Significant at p<0.1, * Significant at p<0.05, ** Significant at p<0.01. 
           
     E=0  E=1/16  E=1/8   
  ALLC  0.24*  0  0.06†   
     (0.10)  (0.04)  (0.03)   
  TFT  0.14†  0.04  0.07*   
     (0.08)  (0.04)  (0.03)   
  TF2T  0  0.24*  0.20**   
     (0.02)  (0.10)  (0.07)   
  TF3T  0  0.42**  0.09*   
     (0.04)  (0.09)  (0.04)   
  2TFT  0.15*  0  0.03   
     (0.07)  (0)  (0.02)   
  2TF2T  0  0.08  0.12*   
     (0)  (0.06)  (0.05)   
  Grim  0.15†  0.03  0.04†   
     (0.08)  (0.02)  (0.02)   
  Grim2  0.16†  0.09  0.05†   
     (0.09)  (0.05)  (0.03)   
  Grim3  0  0  0.11**   
     (0.06)  (0)  (0.04)   
  ALLD  0.07†  0.05  0.23**   
     (0.04)  (0.03)  (0.04)   
  D-TFT  0.09*  0.05  0   
     (0.04)  (0.03)  (0)   
  Gamma  0.35**  0.44**  0.43**   
     (0.03)  (0.03)  (0.02)   
           
 
 
To further explore the difference in play between error and no-error games, we 
reanalyze  data  from  Dal  Bó  &  Frechette  (2011)  and  Dreber  et  al.  (2008)  using  our 
strategy  set  from  Table  2.  Doing  so  finds  TFT  to  be  the  most  common  cooperative 26 
 
strategy in all but one payoff specification.
43 Additionally, the aggregate frequency of 
strategies with memory at most 1 (namely ALLC, TFT, D-TFT, and ALLD) is 76% in the 
games without noise (including our E=0 control), compared to only 33% in our games 
with  noise;  this  difference  is  largely  driven  by  lenient  strategies,  most  of  which  by 
definition  look back  more than one round, and  have an aggregate  frequency of 13% 
without noise compared to 57% with noise.
44  
 
Table  6.  Descriptive  statistics  of  aggregate  behavior,  as  well  as  aggregated  MLE 
frequencies.  All  specifications  use  b/c=4.  The  descriptive  statistics  for  leniency  and 
forgiveness are defined in the text. For MLE aggregation, all strategies other than are 
ALLD and D-TFT are cooperative; lenient strategies are TF2T, TF3T, 2TF2T, Grim2 
and Grim3; forgiving strategies are TFT, TF2T, TF3T, 2TFT and 2TF2T. 
 
           
     E=0  E=1/16  E=1/8   
  Descriptive statistics   
  %C First Round  83%  87%  76%   
  %C All Rounds  78%  82%  59%   
  Leniency  42%  77%  66%   
  Forgiveness  19%  47%  32%   
  MLE aggregation   
  Cooperative strategies  84%  89%  77%   
  Lenient strategies  40%  82%  63%   
  Forgiving strategies  53%  78%  57%   
 
 
The  importance  of  noise  for  promoting  leniency  is  also  reflected  in  the  post-
experimental questionnaire. Many subjects reported cooperating following their partner’s 
first defection because they assumed it was due to error. 
 
V.  Discussion 
 
                                                 
43 See Appendix D for MLE results. 
44 Note that here we do find some evidence of longer-memory strategies, while our test based on adding 
only partner’s play two periods ago found an insignificant effect. This may be in part due to the fact that the 
MLE includes strategies like “Grim” that have a longer memory, and in part to the fact that the no-noise 
case provides less information about play at many histories. The results are qualitatively equivalent when 
restricting our attention to the no-noise payoff specifications where TFT risk-dominates ALLD, 62% of 
strategies use memory at most 1, and lenient strategies have weight 20%. 27 
 
  To  relate  play  in  the  experiment  to  theoretical  predictions,  we  would  like  to 
understand  the  extent  to  which  the  observed  distribution  of  play  approximates  an 
equilibrium, and to the extent that play is not an equilibrium, what sorts of alternative 
strategies  would  perform  better.  To  that  end,  we  used  simulations  to  compute  the 
expected  payoff  matrix  for  the  strategies  that  had  non-negligible  shares  in  the  MLE 
estimation, along with a few “exploitive” strategies that struck us as good responses to 
the commonly used lenient strategies.
45 The resulting payoff matrices are displayed in 
Appendix E. We will use this table to compute the expected payoff to each strategy given 
the  estimated  frequencies,  but  first  we  use  it  to  make  some  observations  about  the 
equilibria of the game. In particular, any strategy that is not a Nash equilibrium in this 
payoff matrix cannot be a Nash equilibrium in the full game. The converse is of course 
false, but we will then check which of the strategies that are equilibria of the payoff 
matrix also are equilibria of the full game.  
Using that calculated payoff matrix we see that the lenient-and-forgiving strategy 
TF2T, which was common when b/c=2.5 or 4, is not an equilibrium in any treatment: it 
can be invaded by DC-Alt (the strategy that alternates between D and C) in all payoff 
specifications, as well as by ALLD when b/c=1.5 and by various “exploitive” strategies 
that start with D in the other treatments.
46 Note also that TFT is never an equilibrium, 
although it is fairly common when b/c=1.5: it is invaded by ALLD when b/c=1.5 and by 
ALLC (!) at other b/c values. This is a reflection of the fact that errors can move TFT into 
an inefficient 2-cycle. 
Of course ALLD is an equilibrium in every treatment, and as discussed in Section 
II, PTFT is an equilibrium at b/c=4. Perhaps surprisingly, it turns out that Grim2 is also 
an equilibrium when b/c=4, even though it is not an equilibrium in the game without 
errors.
47 Moreover, the range of error probabilities for which Grim2 is an equilibrium 
                                                 
45 Analytic computations of the payoff for two different strategies playing each other is complicated due to 
the combination of discounting and noise, especially if the strategies look back more than one round and/or 
have many implicit “states.”  
46 This is because the one round of punishment provided by TF2T, multiplied by the increased probability 
of punishment associated with the first D, is too small to outweigh the short-run gain to deviation.  When 
b/c becomes sufficiently large, it does pay to conform to TF2T at histories where the strategy says to 
cooperate, but then it is also optimal to play C at histories  where TF2T says to play D. Mathematica 
computations show that TF2T is not an equilibrium in any of our treatments.  
47 Without errors it would be  better to play D in the first round and subsequently play Grim2, as the 
continuation payoff after one D is the same as after no D’s at all. However in the presence of errors, the 
expected continuation payoff to Grim2 is lower in the round following a D, and numerical calculations 
show that when b/c=4 and δ=7/8, Grim2 is an equilibrium provided that the error probability is between 28 
 
increases with b/c. Intuitively, there is more reason to be lenient when the rewards to 
cooperation are greater, which is consistent with the way overall leniency in the data 
increases with b/c.  
Of course these equilibrium calculations do not tell us what strategies can persist 
in  a  mixed-strategy  equilibrium,  and  they  do  not  tell  us  which  strategies  have  good 
payoffs given the actual distribution of play. Table 7 shows the expected payoff of each 
strategy given the prevailing strategy frequencies. In the b/c=1.5 treatment, where ALLD 
is most prevalent, ALLD is also the best response to the prevailing strategy frequencies. 
Furthermore, the average earnings per round of subjects for whom ALLD is the strategy 
with  the  greatest  likelihood  are  significantly  higher  than  other  subjects’  earnings 
(coeff=0.108, p=0.028). ALLD does about as well as the average subject in the b/c=2 
treatment (coeff=-0.039, p=0.672), and is significantly worse at b/c=2.5 (coeff=-0.400, 
p<0.001) and b/c=4 (coeff=-0.914, p<0.001).
48 We also see that subjects showed good 
judgment in avoiding PTFT, which performs very poorly in all treatments. 
In the treatments with cooperative equilibria, lenient strategies perform very well. 
Within  each  of  these  treatments, the  highest  payoff  strategy  that  is  played  is  lenient 
(b/c=2,  Grim2;  b/c=2.5,  2TF2T;  b/c=4,  TF2T).  Furthermore,  all  common  lenient 
strategies (frequency of 10% or higher) earn within 1% of the highest payoff earned by 
any strategy played in that treatment, except for 2TF2T at b/c=2, which earns 1.6% less 
than  the  highest  payoff.  Various  start-with-D  strategies  would  have  been  the  highest 
earners  (b/c=2,  D-Grim3;  b/c=2.5  and  b/c=4,  D-TF2T),  but these  strategies  were  not 
played. Perhaps this is because these exploitive strategies do not fit well with subjects’ 
intuitions and heuristics about cooperative play, and only out-performed the cooperative 
strategies by a very small margin (best cooperative strategy earns 5.3% less than best 
exploitative strategy at b/c=2, 0.9% less at b/c=2.5 and 0.2% less at b/c=4). Given the 
incomplete learning we observe in all treatments, it may therefore not be such a surprise 
that  subjects  did  not  discover  the  benefit  of  these  exploitive  strategies.  Furthermore, 
given the roughly equal payoffs, subjects  might reasonably prefer  lenient cooperative 
                                                                                                                                            
0.0332 and 0.2778. Moreover, the exploitive but lenient strategy D-Grim2 is also an equilibrium when 
b/c=4 and δ=7/8, although it is not used. See the online appendix for the Grim2 and D-Grim2 equilibrium 
calculations. 
48 We report the results of a linear regression over profit in all rounds of all interactions, with an ALLD 
dummy as the independent variable, clustered on both subject and interaction pair. 29 
 
strategies  to  those  that  exploit.  Exploring  the  lack  of  exploitative  strategies  is  an 
important direct for future work. 
 
Table 7. Observed frequencies and resulting expected payoffs for each strategy. Highest 
payoff strategy among those that were used is shown in bold; highest payoff strategy 
among all strategies considered is underlined. 
                    
     b/c=1.5  b/c=2  b/c=2.5  b/c=4   
     Frequency 
Expected 
payoff  Frequency 
Expected 
payoff  Frequency 
Expected 
payoff  Frequency 
Expected 
payoff   
  ALLC     -1.25  0.03  6.92     13.27  0.06  28.13   
  TFT  0.19  2.40  0.06  8.71  0.09  14.64  0.07  29.01   
  TF2T  0.05  1.53     8.69  0.17  14.65  0.20  29.67   
  TF3T  0.01  0.90  0.03  8.44  0.05  14.53  0.09  29.56   
  2TFT  0.06  2.87  0.07  8.59  0.02  13.58  0.03  27.08   
  2TF2T     1.86  0.11  8.89  0.11  14.72  0.12  29.62   
  GRIM  0.14  3.02  0.07  8.40  0.11  12.33  0.04  23.99   
  GRIM2  0.06  2.37  0.18  9.03  0.02  13.98  0.05  27.90   
  GRIM3  0.06  1.79  0.28  9.02  0.24  14.67  0.11  29.23   
  ALLD  0.29  3.73  0.17  8.53  0.14  11.33  0.23  21.04   
  D-TFT  0.15  2.89     9.19  0.05  14.66     28.76   
  PTFT     0.72     6.34     12.05     25.36   
 D-TF2T     1.93     9.14     14.87     29.73   
 D-Grim3    2.34    9.54    14.83    28.92   
             
   
Based on the expected payoffs in Table 7, perhaps the largest surprise is not the 
success of leniency and forgiveness, but rather the high proportion of subjects playing 
ALLD, particularly at b/c=4. The reason that low performing strategies such as ALLD 
can persist despite receiving low expected payoffs is probably that the complexity of the 
environment makes it difficult to learn the optimal response. Even though ALLD is not a 
best response to what people are really doing, ALLD is a best response to a belief that 
everyone else plays ALLD or any other history-independent strategy, and because of the 
noisy observation of intended play, subjects who have such false beliefs may not learn 
that  more  cooperative  strategies  yield  a  higher  payoff.  Consistent  with  this,  12%  of 
subjects defected  in  more than 85% of all rounds  in all  interactions at b/c=2, 9% of 
subjects at b/c=2.5 and 16% of subjects at b/c=4. This accounts for a substantial fraction 
of the players classified as ALLD by the MLE, and suggests that these subjects almost 30 
 
never experimented with cooperation, preventing them from learning about its benefits. 
Furthermore,  examining  the  play  of    these  stubborn  defectors,  we  find  no  positive 
correlation between first round cooperation and the previous partner’s cooperation in the 
first round of the previous interaction; in fact the relationship is negative, although not 
significant  (coeff=-0.081,  p=0.882).
49  Thus  meeting  a  first-round  cooperator  does  not 
increase  these  subjects’  probability  of  cooperating  in  future  interactions.  This  is 
reminiscent of heterogeneous self-confirming equilibrium (Fudenberg and Levine 1993), 
and  the  diversity  of  strategies  is  consistent  with  heterogeneous  self-confirming 
equilibrium in the absence of noise; in the presence of noise similar situations can persist 
for a while.
50 A similar logic applies to Grim, which is a best response to the belief that a 
substantial fraction of the population plays Grim while the rest plays ALLD - a subject 
who always uses Grim may not learn about the benefits of being more lenient. 
We find no difference in first round cooperation between b/c=2 and b/c=2.5, and 
that the increase in overall cooperation as b/c increases from 1.5 to 2 is larger than the 
increase in moving from b/c=2 to b/c=2.5, even though ALLD risk-dominates TFT at 
b/c=2 but not b/c=2.5. Thus the risk dominance criterion has at best limited predictive 
power regarding cooperation in games with noise.  
To explore possible non-strategic motivations for leniency and forgiveness, we 
examined the subjects’ social preferences using a post-experiment dictator game and a set 
of survey questions from social psychology. In Dreber, Fudenberg and Rand (2010), we 
show that dictator giving is not correlated with cooperation in histories where there is the 
possibility of leniency, and not consistently correlated with cooperation in histories with 
the possibility for forgiveness. Dictator giving is also uncorrelated with both first-round 
cooperation  and  overall  cooperation  in  the  specifications  with  cooperative  equilibria 
(where leniency and forgiveness are common). Furthermore, while lenient and forgiving 
strategies earn high expected monetary payoffs, the Ernst Fehr and Klaus M. Schmidt 
(1999) model of inequity aversion gives little utility to these strategies. We use this, the 
                                                 
49 When considering only subjects whose realized actions (as opposed to intended actions) resulted in over 
85% D, we also find no correlation between previous partner’s first round cooperation and own cooperation 
in the first round of the present interaction (coeff=-0.350, p=0.828). 
50 Evolutionary models such as the replicator dynamic, when applied to repeated games by restricting the 
strategy set can converge to steady states  with multiple strategies present, as in Feldman and Thomas 
(1987). These polymorphic steady states, however, require that all of the active strategies obtain the same 
payoff, which is not a good approximation of the situation here. 31 
 
survey data and additional analysis to argue that social preferences do not seem to be a 
key factor in explaining the leniency and forgiveness observed in our experiments.  
 
VI.  Conclusion 
 
We conclude that subjects do tend to cooperate in noisy repeated games when 
there is a cooperative equilibrium, that they cooperate even when there are no cooperative 
equilibria  in  memory-1  strategies,  and  that  they  cooperate  even  when  TFT  is  risk-
dominated by ALLD. This shows that conclusions based on evolutionary game theory 
models that incorporate the memory-1 restriction need not apply to play in laboratory 
experiments, and that subjects can and do use strategies with more complexity. We also 
see that strategies such as TF2T that involve leniency and forgiveness are both common 
and rather successful in the sense of obtaining high payoffs given the actual distribution 
of play, even though it is not an equilibrium for all agents to play TF2T: In an uncertain 
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Appendix A – MLE strategy frequency estimates using simulated data 
Table A1. Maximum likelihood estimates for simulated histories. For each b/c ratio, the 
first column shows the actual frequency in the simulated data, and the second column 
shows the MLE estimate. Bootstrapped standard errors shown in parentheses. 
† Significant at p<0.1, * Significant at p<0.05, ** Significant at p<0.01 
                   
     b/c=1.5  b/c=2  b/c=2.5  b/c=4 
     Actual  Estimated  Actual  Estimated  Actual  Estimated  Actual  Estimated 
   ALLC  0  0  0.03  0.02  0  0  0.05  0.05* 
        (0)     (0.02)     (0)     (0.03) 
   TFT  0.18  0.18**  0.08  0.08**  0.08  0.08**  0.10  0.10** 
        (0.05)     (0.04)     (0.04)     (0.04) 
   TF2T  0.03  0.03†  0  0  0.17  0.19**  0.18  0.18** 
        (0.02)     (0)     (0.05)     (0.05) 
   TF3T  0  0  0.03  0.02  0.05  0.08*  0.08  0.04† 
        (0)     (0.03)     (0.05)     (0.03) 
   2TF2T  0  0  0.10  0.10**  0.13  0.09*  0.12  0.13** 
        (0)     (0.04)     (0.05)     (0.05) 
   Grim  0.22  0.22**  0.10  0.10**  0.12  0.12**  0.03  0.03† 
        (0.05)     (0.04)     (0.04)     (0.02) 
  Grim2  0.03  0.03†  0.20  0.19**  0.02  0.02  0.07  0.07* 
        (0.02)     (0.05)     (0.02)     (0.03) 
  Grim3  0.08  0.08**  0.28  0.31**  0.25  0.24**  0.12  0.14** 
        (0.03)     (0.06)     (0.06)     (0.04) 
  PTFT  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0 
        (0)     (0)     (0)     (0) 
  2PTFT  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0 
        (0)     (0)     (0)     (0) 
  2TFT  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0 
        (0)     (0)     (0)     (0) 
  T2  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0 
        (0)     (0)     (0)     (0) 
   ALLD  0.28  0.28**  0.17  0.17**  0.13  0.13**  0.25  0.25** 
        (0.06)     (0.06)     (0.05)     (0.06) 
  C-to-ALLD  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0 
        (0)     (0)     (0)     (0) 
  D-TFT  0.17  0.17**  0  0  0.05  0.05†  0  0 
        (0.05)     (0)     (0.03)     (0) 
  D-TF2T  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0 
        (0)     (0)     (0)     (0) 
  D-TF3T  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0 
        (0)     (0)     (0)     (0) 
  D-Grim2  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0 
        (0)     (0)     (0)     (0) 
  D-Grim3  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0 
        (0)     (0)     (0)     (0) 
  DC-Alt  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0 
        (0)     (0)     (0)     (0) 
  Gamma    0.02    0.02    0    0.05** 
        (0.01)     (0.01)     (0.01)     (0.01) 
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Appendix B – Evidence of learning 
First,  we  investigate  the  extent  of  learning  over  the  session  for  each  payoff 
specification using E=1/8.
51 We do this by examining cooperation in the first round of 
each interaction (Figure 1), because this reflects each subject's strategy independent of 
the play of their current partner. There is no significant relationship between interaction 
number and first round cooperation when b/c=1.5 (coeff=0.006, p=0.788), a significant 
positive  relationship  when  b/c=2  (coeff=0.089,  p=0.001),  and  a  non-significant 
relationship  with  a  nonetheless  rather  sizable  positive  coefficient  when  b/c=2.5 
(coeff=0.056 p=0.100) and b/c=4 (coeff=0.034, p=0.166).  
Examining  learning  at  the  individual  level  for  the  E=1/8  conditions,  we  see  a 
significant positive correlation between first round cooperation and the previous partner’s 
cooperation in the first round of the previous interaction (coeff=0.335, p<0.001).
52 Thus 
meeting cooperative partners tends to make one play more cooperatively, although the 
effect size is moderate (average probability of first round cooperation after meeting a 
defector, 65%; after meeting a cooperator, 72%).  
We turn now to the lower error rate controls. In the E=1/16 control, we find a similar 
relationship  between  first  round  cooperation  and  the  previous  partner’s  first  round 
decision (coeff=0.513, p=0.047; after defection, 81%; after cooperation 88%), although 
there is no overall change in first round cooperation across interactions (coeff=0.005, 
p=0.898). For E=0, the opposite is true: there is no significant relationship between first 
round cooperation and the previous partner’s opening move (coeff=-0.073, p=0.818), but 
there is a significant increase in cooperation across interactions (coeff=0.129, p=0.034). 
Thus there is also evidence of learning in both controls.  
                                                 
51  We  report  the  results  from  a  logistic  regression  over  all  individual  first  round  decisions,  with  the 
interaction number as the independent variable. To account for the non-independence of observations from 
a given subject, and from subjects within a given pairing, we clustered on both subject and interaction pair. 
52 The positive correlation between first round cooperation and the previous partner’s cooperation in the 
first round of the previous interaction remains significant (coeff=0.291, p=0.001) when controlling for 
interaction number and b/c ratio, and we find no significant interaction either interaction number (coeff=-
0.016, p=0.484) or b/c ratio (coeff=0.0003, p=0.998). Furthermore, we continue to observe this positive 
relationship when restricting our analysis to the last 4 rounds of each interaction (coeff=0.342, p=0.001). 
Thus  the  effect  of  meeting  cooperative  partners  does  not  appear  to  vary  across  interaction  or  payoff 
specification. 38 
 
Appendix C – MLE strategy frequencies using full 20 strategy set 
Table A2. Maximum likelihood estimates for the last 4 interactions of each session, all 20 
strategies. Bootstrapped standard errors in parentheses.  
† Significant at p<0.1, * Significant at p<0.05, ** Significant at p<0.01 
    b/c=1.5  b/c=2  b/c=2.5  b/c=4  b/c=4  b/c=4   
    E = 1/8  E = 1/8  E = 1/8  E = 1/8  E = 1/16  E = 0   
  ALLC  0  0.03  0  0.05†  0  0.24*   
     (0)  (0.03)  (0.02)  (0.03)  (0.05)  (0.10)   
  TFT  0.19**  0.07  0.09*  0.07*  0.04  0.15*   
     (0.05)  (0.04)  (0.04)  (0.03)  (0.03)  (0.07)   
  TF2T  0.05†  0  0.16*  0.19**  0.22*  0   
     (0.03)  (0)  (0.07)  (0.06)  (0.09)  (0.03)   
  TF3T  0.01  0.03  0.05  0.09*  0.40**  0   
     (0.01)  (0.03)  (0.04)  (0.04)  (0.11)  (0.03)   
  2TFT  0.06  0.07†  0.02  0.03  0  0.16*   
     (0.04)  (0.04)  (0.02)  (0.02)  (0)  (0.07)   
  2TF2T  0  0.11*  0.11†  0.12*  0.08  0   
     (0.02)  (0.05)  (0.06)  (0.06)  (0.07)  (0)   
  Grim  0.14**  0.05  0.11*  0.02  0.02  0.12   
     (0.05)  (0.05)  (0.05)  (0.02)  (0.02)  (0.08)   
  Grim2  0.05†  0.16*  0.02  0.05†  0.09†  0.16*   
     (0.03)  (0.07)  (0.03)  (0.03)  (0.05)  (0.08)   
  Grim3  0.06†  0.27**  0.24**  0.11*  0  0   
     (0.03)  (0.08)  (0.08)  (0.04)  (0)  (0.05)   
  PTFT  0  0  0  0  0.02  0   
     (0)  (0)  (0)  (0)  (0.02)  (0)   
  2PTFT  0  0.03  0  0  0.01  0   
     (0)  (0.03)  (0)  (0)  (0.02)  (0)   
  T2  0  0  0  0  0  0   
     (0)  (0)  (0)  (0)  (0)  (0.01)   
  ALLD  0.27**  0.17**  0.14**  0.21**  0.05  0.06†   
     (0.05)  (0.06)  (0.05)  (0.04)  (0.03)  (0.03)   
  C-to-ALLD  0  0.01  0  0.01  0.02  0.02   
     (0.01)  (0.02)  (0)  (0.01)  (0.02)  (0.02)   
  D-TFT  0.10**  0  0.03  0  0.02  0   
     (0.04)  (0)  (0.03)  (0)  (0.02)  (0.02)   
  D-TF2T  0  0  0.01  0  0.02  0   
     (0)  (0)  (0.02)  (0)  (0.01)  (0.03)   
  D-TF3T  0.01  0  0  0  0  0.04   
     (0.01)  (0)  (0)  (0)  (0)  (0.03)   
  D-Grim2  0.05†  0.01  0  0.01  0  0   
     (0.03)  (0.01)  (0.01)  (0.01)  (0.01)  (0)   
  D-Grim3  0  0  0.01  0  0.03  0.04   
     (0)  (0)  (0.01)  (0)  (0.03)  (0.03)   
  DC-Alt  0  0  0  0.01  0  0   
     (0)  (0)  (0)  (0.01)  (0)  (0)   
  Gamma  0.46**  0.49**  0.49**  0.43**  0.43**  0.34**   
     (0.02)  (0.03)  (0.03)  (0.02)  (0.02)  (0.02)   39 
 
Appendix D – MLE strategy frequencies for previous experiments without noise 
 
Table  A3.  Maximum  likelihood  estimates  for  Dal  Bó  and  Frechette  (2011),  the  two-
option control games from Dreber et al (2008) and a b/c=4 no-error control session. For 
δ=1/2, the last 16 interactions  were analyzed, and for δ=3/4, the last 8 interactions. 
Bootstrapped standard errors in parentheses. Note that MLE results for our no-noise 
treatment is shown in the main text, Table 5. 
† Significant at p<0.1, * Significant at p<0.05, ** Significant at p<0.01. 
                     
    Dal Bo and Frechette 2011  Dreber et al 2008   
  Payoff  R=32  R=40  R=48  R=32  R=40  R=48  b/c=1.5  b/c=2   
  δ  0.5  0.5  0.5  0.75  0.75  0.75  0.75  0.75   
  ALLC  0  0  0.01  0  0  0.02  0  0   
    (0)  (0.01)  (0.02)  (0)  (0.02)  (0.04)  (0)  (0)   
  TFT  0.07†  0.06  0.24**  0.23**  0.21†  0.55**  0.15*  0.40**   
    (0.04)  (0.04)  (0.06)  (0.07)  (0.12)  (0.15)  (0.06)  (0.15)   
  TF2T  0  0.02  0.16*  0.11  0.22**  0  0  0   
    (0)  (0.02)  (0.07)  (0.07)  (0.06)  (0)  (0)  (0)   
  TF3T  0  0  0.01  0  0  0.06  0  0   
    (0)  (0.01)  (0.02)  (0)  (0.02)  (0.04)  (0)  (0)   
  2TFT  0  0.06  0  0  0.35**  0.09  0  0   
    (0)  (0.04)  (0)  (0.02)  (0.13)  (0.09)  (0)  (0)   
  2TF2T  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0   
    (0)  (0)  (0.04)  (0.04)  (0.06)  (0)  (0)  (0)   
  Grim  0  0  0  0  0.04  0.2  0.07  0.21   
    (0)  (0.02)  (0)  (0.02)  (0.06)  (0.12)  (0.04)  (0.16)   
  Grim2  0  0.01  0.02  0  0  0.02  0  0   
    (0)  (0.01)  (0.02)  (0)  (0.01)  (0.04)  (0)  (0)   
  Grim3  0  0.01  0.02  0  0  0.06†  0  0   
    (0)  (0.01)  (0.02)  (0)  (0.01)  (0.04)  (0)  (0)   
  ALLD  0.91**  0.76**  0.49**  0.66**  0.11*  0  0.64**  0.3**   
    (0.04)  (0.06)  (0.07)  (0.07)  (0.05)  (0)  (0.1)  (0.11)   
  D-TFT  0.02  0.08†  0.04  0  0.08†  0  0.14  0.09   
    (0.02)  (0.04)  (0.03)  (0)  (0.04)  (0)  (0.09)  (0.07)   
  Gamma  0.34**  0.49**  0.4**  0.45**  0.32**  0.28**  0.36**  0.42**   
    (0.04)  (0.04)  (0.04)  (0.04)  (0.03)  (0.03)  (0.03)  (0.03)   
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Appendix E – Calculated payoff matrices 
Figure A1. Row player’s payoff is shown, averaged over 10
5 randomly simulated games 
using c=1, e=1/8 and δ=7/8. Best response in each column is shown in bold. 
 
 
 
 